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Abstract
Until recently, the transfer of professional teamplayers between European clubs
placed limits on the operations of a free market in that there were rules restricting the
terms placed on such transfers. However, the ruling of the European Court of Justice
in December 1995 in the “Bosman case” declared that such arrangements were contrary
to the provisions of article 48 of the EEC treaty. The effects of the ruling –a redistribu-
tion of property rights from the clubs to the players- induced an increase of average
player salaries and longer contract duration. Using data from the National Basketball
Association (NBA) the paper discusses a highly similar reallocation of property
rights in North America and tests empirically the -so far- inconclusive question, if
remuneration and contract-length are complementary or substitutes.
11. Introduction and Research Question
In December 1995 the European Court of Justice decided that the rules governing the
national transfer systems in professional soccer, and player limits on the number of
foreign nationals under contract to any one club, were contrary to the Treaty of Rome
which guarantees the free movement of workers within the European Union.
In Germany, for example, the rules of the transfer system specified that a club was
always entitled to ask for a fee from a former player’s new club1, even if the player’s
contract with his old team had expired. From an economic point of view, one of the
predictable consequences of the "Bosman-ruling" is that teams will sign their players
to longer-term contracts, because nowadays transfer fees are in accordance with the
Treaty of Rome only if the player is still under contract. Players whose contract is
about to elapse are free to negotiate with any team they wish. If the old team is not
willing to offer the player terms at least as favorable as another team that wants to
sign him, the athlete is free to move. In this case, his old team is no longer entitled to
claim compensation from the player’s new club.2
It is very likely that the resulting redistribution of property rights (from the team to
the player) will have specific consequences. On the one hand, average player in-
comes will rise and on the other hand, average contract duration will increase too,
developments that can indeed be observed since the season 1996/97 in all major
European soccer leagues.
                                                
1   The principal reason for that is, that the certainty of receiving a fee for the services of out of con   tract play-
ers acts as an incentive to clubs to invest in training players.
2 This kind of labor arrangements were first observed in Major League Baseball (MLB) in 1975, when the
league underwent a significant institutional change. Prior to that year club owners held virtual monopsony
power in the negotiation relationship with players. All players contracts contained a required agreement or
“reserve clause” that allowed for negotiations exclusively with the current holder of their contracts. The rul-
ing agreement liberated certain players from reserve clause bounds. These players, whose eligibility is based
on seniority, are “ free agents” and may essentially bid their services to all teams at the expiration of their
current contract.
2Since then, team managers keep arguing that long-term contracts lead to a deteriora-
tion of player motivation. Employment contracts that guarantee earnings over a des-
ignated future time, so the argument goes, induce shirking.3 Whether this is really the
case, remains open, because so far only anecdotal evidence has been presented to
support the assumption.
Given this background, the goal of this paper is twofold:
· Firstly, we develop two competing hypotheses. One is derived from the principal-
agent-theory that assumes a conflict of objectives between profit maximizing teams
and utility maximizing players. In this view, contractually secured income may en-
tice the player to shirk if the utility sacrificed with effort is not offset with income.
The other hypothesis is derived from the tournament literature and goes like this:
Secured income contracts are employed as an incentive mechanism to reward the
most productive players. Thus, long-term contracts can be seen as part of a lucra-
tive compensation package for a small number of exceptional players.
· Secondly we will use data from the North American "National Basketball Associa-
tion"(NBA) to test whether players signing long-term contracts have to pay for the
increase in security by accepting lower salaries or whether long-term contracts and
high salaries are complementary rather than substituting contract components. Us-
ing data from one of the North American Major Leagues has several advantages:
- Comparable data for one of the European soccer leagues is simply not avail-
able, although using data from professional soccer is much easier to come by
than firm specific data. In contrast to the US, player income and especially con-
tract terms are not disclosed in Europe.
- As mentioned above, in the United States the courts have initiated a redistribu-
tion of property rights similar to the one induced by the Bosman-ruling in the
mid 1970s already, when they abolished the "reserve rule". It is very likely,
                                                                                                                                                         
3 Economic theory implies that guaranteed long-term employment contracts induce players to behave opportunis-
tically. Theory does also suggest that risk-avers players (employees) will prefer long-term contracts whereas a
risk-loving agent does also consider a short-term contract.
3therefore, that team owners and players have fully adapted and adjusted their
respective behavior to the new circumstances.
Before presenting the data and empirical findings, we will first derive two partially
rival hypotheses that will then be tested and after I conclude with a short summary
and some implications for further research.
2. Competing Hypotheses
Theories of contract length generally view optimal contract duration as trading off the
marginal benefits against the marginal costs of increasing contract length. In recent
years, numerous articles and books have analyzed the costs as well as the benefits of
increasing contract lengths. Obviously, the most important advantages of long-term
contracts are the following:
· improvements in the allocation of risk,
· the promotion of relations-specific investments, and
· the spreading of contracting costs over time.
However, these advantages may come at a high price. The value of a known expira-
tion date in the near future exposes the worker to the discipline of the market. If the
worker believes that his future wages will depend upon his past performance, he
may be induced to put forth effort that is otherwise difficult to observe.4 If contractual
wages cannot be made contingent on output because writing and enforcing such con-
tracts is too costly, then fixed term contracts of a short duration are necessary in order
to provide the worker with an incentive to put forth effort. For that reason, shorter
contracts with more frequent renegotiations reduce the level of shirking, but they also
reduce the worker´s readiness to invest in the acquisition of relation-specific human
                                                
4 Nearing the end of the employment contract it is most likely that players will try to maximize effort. Recon-
tracting and renegotiation is close by and the players’ recent performance is well known by team managers,
4capital. In addition to that they lead to a less efficient allocation of risk and they re-
quire that contracting costs are borne more frequently. Finite contracts are therefore
more likely when recontracting costs are small and/or when the return to effort is
large. In sum, the optimal contract length minimizes the sum of contracting and shirk-
ing costs.
We assume that contract expiration permits wage revisions that incorporate new in-
formation on the worker´s productivity while within-contract renegotiations are pro-
hibited. Without developing an elaborate formal model, consider a worker whose
ability at is known to follow a random walk with increments, dt
(1) at = at-1 + dt
His total productivity yt is the sum of his ability at, his effort et and temporary noise,
zt
 (2) yt = at + et + zt
I further assume that all firms observe yt and know its past values. However, the
components of yt cannot be observed independently. Moreover, despite its observ-
ability yt is only partly suitable for contractual wage contingencies.
It can be shown that the worker will put forth effort during the last periods of the con-
tract and no effort before this period. The intuition behind that strategy is that the
worker perceives he will be rewarded for effort during the recontracting period. As
long as recontracting is sufficiently distant, the perceived future gain from effort
outweighs its current direct cost. Therefore, only during the last periods of the con-
tract effort is incentive-compatible. Under these conditions, workers who are highly
                                                                                                                                                         
audiences and player-scouts. Hence, keeping a good reputation is vital for the player’s succeeding contract’s
salary and duration.
5productive will choose a contract of short duration only to commit themselves to be
exposed to the market´s wage revisions. Having made such a constraining commit-
ment, their unobservable effort becomes incentive compatible. Thus, we would an-
ticipate a trade-off between wages and contract length, which leads us to the first hy-
pothesis of empirical testing:
Hypothesis 1a
The longer the duration of the contract, the lower c.p. the worker´s wage.
If, however, secured long-term contracts are used as an incentive mechanism another
result is more likely to occur:
· Long-term contracts may be used to recognize and reward the most productive
employees. Workers are normally awarded long-term contracts only after they have
proved themselves as exceptional or at least consistent producers. In this sense, the
reward of a long-term contract is consistent with Lazear´s delayed compensation
model: Workers are undercompensated early in their career but are motivated to
work hard in order to stay with the firm and collect their due compensation later in
their career. This results because holding out payment until late in the individual’s
lifetime alters the worker’s incentives to reduce his effort on the job.5 6
· Likewise, the reward of a long-term contract may be part of a lucrative com-
pensation package designed to increase competition among workers. In a "Lazear
and Rosen-world", long-term contracts may serve as tournament incentives for which
workers compete by increasing their individual effort levels.7
                                                
5 Economists have concerned themselves with the relationship between a worker’s wage rate and his productiv-
ity. Since workers are the agents of the owners of the firm, it is not automatic that the interests of workers
and owners coincide. Hence, Lazear argues that an upward-sloping age-earnings-profile performs such a task.
Age-earnings profiles pay workers less than the value of marginal products when they are young and more than
the value of marginal products when they are old.
6 In my Ph.D. thesis I try to bring some more light into that aspect: Using data from four major-league team
sports (Basketball NBA; Ice hockey NHL; American Football NFL and Baseball ABL/NBL) it is possible to
test empirically three economic theories. These are Gary Becker`s human capital model, Ed Lazear’s senior-
ity-pay approach and Boyan Jovanovic’s matching theory.
7 Lazear and Rosen (1981).
6· Moreover, long-term contracts may be the result of an efficient risk ma-
nagement on the part of the firm. If long-term contracts can be observed most fre-
quently for highly productive and consistent workers, these contracts are apparently
designed to secure the services of the most important actors (who are also the ones
most desired by the firm´s competitors).
Summarizing, we would expect pay and contract duration to be complementary
rather than substituting contract components. This aspect will be analyzed by using
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b:
The longer the duration of the contract, the higher c.p. the worker´s wage.
If information asymmetries cannot be reduced ex ante, but only after the worker has
joined the firm, it is very likely that "movers" (persons departing the firm after their
contract has expired and joining another firm) are paid less than otherwise identical
"stayer" (persons signing a new contract with their old firm). The intuition is straight-
forward. Since the old firm has more reliable information about the worker (there is
less quality uncertainty here) than any other potential employer, the latter will not
only pay less than what the worker would earn if he stayed with his former em-
ployer, but the new employer will also offer the worker a short-term contract only.8
Hypothesis 2:
Players moving to another employer will suffer an income decrease and face shorter
con-tract length.
3. Data, Models, and Empirical Findings
                                                
8 Although that some of the information asymmetries might be mitigated due to the measurable performance
indicators the ”new” club can not completely assess in how far the newly acquired player integrates with the
team. Even if a player’s statistics reveal high productivity he might simply not match personally to the team.
7The data set is hand-collected and is drawn from two primary sources, the Sporting
News Register and the Sporting News Guide. It consists of all players that appeared in at
least one regular season game in any of the NBA-seasons 1990/91-1999/2000. The
total number of observations is about 4500, with some players being active in all 10
seasons and others in only one of them.9 While single player performance figures
(games played, minutes, field goals, free throws, three points, rebounds, assists,
blocks, turnovers, steals etc.) and individual characteristics (age, career duration,
years with current team) are available for all athletes10, this is not the case for player
salaries and contract duration.11 The former information is missing for approximately
6% of the population, the latter for about 52%. Complete information is available for
2031 ”player years” (45,4%). Moreover I computed gini-coefficients to capture pay
dispersion for each squad over the 10 years and furthermore gini-coefficients to
measure productivity inequality for each team. This investigation however, is not
part of this paper.
                                                
9   These are either rookie players (no experience) who just entered the league or veteran players who play their
last season.
10   There are 1002 different players for the whole 10 years of investigation.
11 Although it is all but easy to acquire data in the field of sports, income figures and contract terms are much
harder to obtain. This is in particular true for an amount of 4500 observations.
8Table 1: Summary Statistics
Player Characteristics Mean Std Dev
Career Length 5,74 3,93
Years with Current Team (tenure) 2,39 2,18
All Star Games12 0,46 1,56
Draft Number 32,84 32,66
Player Statistics (Performance measures)
Minutes per Game 21,21 10,87
Scoring Performance per Minute(SP) 0,59 0,25
Non-Scoring Performance per Min-
ute(NSP)13
133,12 177,60
Contract Characteristics
Annual Salary (in US$) 2.000.700
Contract Duration (in years) 3,62 2,40
Using the data described in table 1, we estimate three different regression models.
· Model (1) is a standard Mincer-type wage equation that tries to identify player
salaries determinants.14 Since this model has been estimated in a large number of
studies already,15 it serves as a reference model, against which Model (2) and
                                                
12 Each year play the best players from the East versus the best from the West in an exhibition game.
13   Harder (1992). NSP is a composite measure of passive performance and team attributes ability. It is computed
using the variety of explanatory variables as the following formula: rebounds+assists +blocks+steals - (field
goals attempted – field goals made) - (free throws attempted – free throws made)/minutes. SP are the direct
points (offensive skills).
14   Ignoring contract length issues the data set estimates the salary determination model with 4260 valuable ob-
servations.
15   See i.e. Dabschek (1975a); Jones and Walsh (1988); Idson and Kahane (1998) and Frick, Lehmann and Weigand
(1999).
9Model (3) will be evaluated. Moreover, our estimates should be far more reliable
than the ones presented in the literature so far, because the data set used here is
considerable larger and covers a much longer period of time.
· To the best of my knowledge, Model (2) has not yet been estimated. A variable
measuring the length of the individual player’s contract is added to the simple
specification of model (1). This should allow to discriminate between hypotheses
(1a) and (1b). While the former hypothesis postulates a trade-off between contract
duration and player income, the latter postulates that higher incomes and longer
contracts should instead be found simultaneously.
· Model (3) extends model (2). First, a dummy variable measuring a team change is
added and, second, an interaction term (team change times contract length) is in-
cluded into the specification. Since the new team is less informed about a player’s
abilities and motivation than his old team, a team change should c.p. lead to an in-
come reduction. However, in the case of "superstars" who sign long term contracts
when joining a new team, the effect of a longer duration should compensate the
loss of income that accompanies a team change.
The three models are of the following general form and will be estimated using the
statistical package STATA 6.0. (where a1 - a12 are estimated parameters).
(1)   ln(Y) = a0 + a1DN + a2ASG + a3PY + a4PY2 + a5YCT + a6YCT2
         + a7MPG + a8SP + a9NSP + X´TD + X´YD + e
(2)   ln(Y) = a0 + a1DN + a2ASG + a3PY + a4PY2 + a5YCT + a6YCT2
         + a7MPG + a8SP + a9NSP + a10CL + X´TD + X´YD + e
10
(3)   ln(Y) = a0 + a1DN + a2ASG + a3PY + a4PY2 + a5YCT + a6YCT2          
+ a7MPG + a8SP + a9NSP + a10CL + a11TC + a12CL*TC
            + X´TD + X´YD + e
with ln(Y): log of annual salary
DN: draft number16
ASG: number of all-star games
PY: years as a professional
YCT: years with current team
SP: scoring performance
NSP: non-scoring performance
CL: contract length
TC: new contract signed with new team (0=no; 1=yes)
X’ TD:each model is estimated with team-dummies
X’YD: each model is estimated with year-dummies
e: random error term
The inclusion of the squared terms in above equations captures both the positive ef-
fect of experience and the negative effect of aging and controls additionally for non-
linearity. Again, following Mincer (1974) an inverted U-shaped experience effect is
predicted, indicating the concave income profile meaning that salaries increase with
longer career length and/or further tenure. Since we have a model with an endoge-
                                                
16 The NBA draft mechanism is conducted at the end of the season and is a very important institution in all ma-
jor-league sports. The draft is the principal device for the franchises (teams) to secure new talent or rebuild
after a losing season. The rules of the draft dictate the order in which professional teams get to select amateur
college basketball players. Before 1985, the first pick in the draft was determined by a coin toss between
teams of the Western and Eastern Conference with the worst win-loss records. The rest of the teams in the
league then selected players in the inverse order of their prior regular season records, with the best team pick-
ing last in each round. To reduce the incentive for teams to underachieve deliberately so as to get one of the
best picks, the draft lottery was inaugurated in 1985 and further developed in 1993. In 1993 the draft lottery
was a weighted system. The team with the worst record of the 11 nonplay-off teams has a 17 percent chance of
getting the number-one draft pick, the next worst team has a 15 percent chance and the probability descends to
a 1 percent chance for the team with the best record among those eligible for the lottery. Hence, the draft lot-
tery enforces competitive balance in the league and leads to relatively equal playing strength between league
members and holds the competition ”entertaining”.
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nously determined right hand side variable -because contract duration and salary are
determined simultaneously- the latter two models are estimated by an instrumental
variables approach (2SLS), while model (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS).
Perhaps a plain look tells us something about which part of the joint hypothesis 1 we
might detect. Figure 1 displays the percentages of players signing contracts of differ-
ent lengths. It appears that 43,7% of those joining a new team ("mover") sign contracts
with duration of at most one year. Long term contracts of five years and more are of-
fered to slightly more than a fifth of all movers. On the other hand, 52% of those re-
maining with their old franchise ("stayer") sign contracts of at least five years. Here the
percentage of contracts of at most one year is less than 11%.
Figure 1: Contract Length for Movers and Stayers.
Table 2 reveals that player salaries increase with contract length - irrespective of
whether the player remains with his old team or joins a new one. Only if a player
Contract Lenght Comparison for Stayer and Mover
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signs a contract with a duration of at least 10 years (less than 2% of all contracts) he
has to accept a lower salary (on average, players appear for approximately six sea-
sons in the NBA). We would expect age to have only a slight negative effect on per-
formance when the player is little past the peak, but the decline gains in magnitude
as the player ages. Hence, the drop in salary after playing 10 years basketball might
be because players age and this is not leveled-off by the gain of experience.
Table 2: Contract Duration and Average Annual Income in US$.17 18
Contract Duration
Stayer Mover MI in % of SI*
< 1 year 73.000 49.000 67
1 -2 years 1.444.643 440.608 31
3 - 4 years 2.206.075 1.387.155 63
5 - 6 years 3.400.300 2.541.188 74
7 - 9 years 4.524.213 3.350.347 75
10 years and more 4.278.857 2.038.000 48
Total 2.883.100 1.143.000 40
* Mover’s Income as percentage of Stayer’s Income.
Let us now turn to the results. Estimates of equation 1-3 are reported in Table 3. As
can be seen, all parameters influence the standard salary determination model
(model1) in the forecasted manner, that is, these coefficients have the sign as antici-
pated and are statistically significant. More than 62% of the variance in player earn-
ings is explained by the independent variables, according to the adjusted R-squared
value obtained from the regression, a finding that is also in accordance with the one
reported in other studies. For example a player who scores 1,0 point per minute in-
stead of the average 0,6 points earns c.p.15,4% more than the average performing ath-
                                                
17   Numbers are not inflated yet, but the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is accessible.
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lete. Likewise, a player competing 25 minutes per game on the field instead of the
average 21 minutes has a 20% higher income. The same is happening with the draft
variable. If our expectation is correct, a lower draft pick indicates better talent and
players should be compensated more. Hence estimates of a1 should be negative. The
coefficient of the draft variable indicates that being picked at 15th instead of 33rd (av-
erage) pays-off in an 18% higher salary. Similarly, all-star players who demonstrate
unusual skills that attract fans should earn greater salaries, all else equal. The all-star
coefficient displays that a player who has one standard deviation more all-star games
than the average player c.p. earns 12% more money.
Model (2) displays that the coefficients estimated in model (1) suffer from an "omitted
variable bias": Especially the coefficients of the career and the tenure variables are
significantly trimmed (by about 60% and 50% respectively) once the length of the con-
tract is controlled for. Moreover, contract length has a significantly positive influence
on player salaries. Signing a four- instead of a three-year contract (3,6 years is the av-
erage) goes hand in hand with a 25%-increase in annual earnings.
Model (3) shows that the influence of contract length on player salaries differs signifi-
cantly between stayer and mover. While stayers enjoy a 15%-increase in earnings
with every additional year of contract length, movers suffer a 77%-decrease.19 How-
ever, some players can compensate this loss by signing contracts of an unusually
long duration. Guaranteed contracts that are concluded for a period of at least eight
                                                                                                                                                         
18   For performance statistics on movers and stayers see appendix.
19 At first hand this income reduction seems unreasonable large and might not only be explained by information
asymmetries. There is again one further institutional aspect that must be considered here, which is the so-
called “salary cap”. The salary cap is a maximum dollar amount teams can spend on player contracts. A sal-
ary cap is also necessary to maintain competitive balance in the league. Without a salary cap, teams with
deeper pockets can simply outspend the remaining teams for the better free agents. The basic idea is that a
team can only sign a free agent if the total salaries for the team will be below the salary cap. So a team with
deep pockets is playing on a level playing field with every other team. To avoid that salary cap restriction
teams try to bypass that obstacle and sign movers by just paying them very little in their first year of new-
contracting, but annual income growth heavily in the following years of new-contracting. Thus, that effect
might take place in the 2SLS model and must be tested next. Nevertheless, it won’t be that at all. More likely
is a mixture of asymmetric information regarding the new club and escaping the salary cap.
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years make the mover better off than an otherwise identical stayer who re-signed for
the same period of time. However, only 22 out of 986 movers (2,2%) are able to sign a
contract of eight or more years.
Table 3: The Determinants of Player Salaries in the NBA (1990/91-1999/2000).
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
DN -0,011
(-16,95)***
-0,006
(-10,92)***
-0,007
(8,80)***
ASG 0,073
(4,25)***
0,046
(3,17)***
0,046
(3,06)***
PY 0,103
(5,90)***
0,040
(2,57)*
0,054
(3,16)***
PY2 -0,005
(-4,74)***
-0,00004
(-0,04)+
-0,001
(-0,86)+
YCT 0,268
(10,17)***
0,122
(5,32)***
0,096
(2,52)*
YCT2 -0,017
(-7,23)***
-0,007
(-3,57)***
-0,005
(-1,80)+
MPG 0,049
(20,10)***
0,035
(16,14)***
0,030
(12,54)***
SP 0,361
(4,34)***
0,367
(5,20)***
0,40
(5,84)***
NSP# 0,045
(3,48)***
0,032
(2,90)***
0,044
(4,35)***
CL - 0,246
(28,10)***
0,148
(3,03)***
TC - - -0,775
(-11,21)***
TC*CL - - 0,174
(4,37)***
CONST 11,73
(89,30)***
11,41
(100,25)***
12,66
(61,59)***
Adj. R2 * 100 62,6 73,1 74,1
F-Value 76,9 121,1 293,6
N of Cases 2.031 2031 2031
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; + n.s. (t-values in brackets).
# Coefficient multiplied by 100.
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Model (1) includes 28 team dummies (reference team: Cleveland Cavaliers), nine year
dummies (reference year: 1996/97) and two position dummies (reference position:
guard). The dummies control for local and season specific events.20 21
4. Concluding Remarks and Implications for Further Research
According to the estimates, there is no trade-off between contract length and player
income. To the contrary: Apparently, the two contract components are highly com-
plementary - the longer the contract, the higher the player´s income. The findings
support hypothesis (1b) postulating that long-term contracts are used to reward the
best and the most consistent players, who succeeded in an intra-team tournament.
This does not contradict agency-theory, but implies that long-term contracts are em-
ployed to reveal players who are unlikely to shirk. This result may be extended to
other professions where secured contracts are used as an incentive mechanism, which
sorts for the most productive workers. Since information asymmetries are higher
when a player joins a new team, movers are less likely to get long-term contracts. Mo-
reover, movers are paid less than otherwise identical stayer.
The next step to be taken is to calculate the "insurance premium" movers have to pay
by accepting significant reductions in pay. Using the decomposition method devel-
oped by Oaxaca and Blinder, it is possible to calculate what a mover would earn if he
stayed with his old team and compare this with his actual earnings. Although team
change is -in a strict sense- not an exogenous variable, the number of players who re-
                                                
20 With a view to greater clarity the dummy coefficients are not included in the table above, but are available
upon request.
21 There is a very good example for that aspect: The 1998/99 year (season) dummy has a significantly negative
slope, indicating that salaries were considerable lower in that season with reference to 1996/97. In 1998/99 the
NBA locked-out their players, due to exaggerated wage demands. Instead of the 82 regular season games, only
60% (50 games) were played in that season. Some additional information to the above mentioned salary cap: In
1997/98 the cap was $27 million, in 1998/99 $30 million and in 1999/00 $34 million, whereas only $12 million
at the outset of our evaluation in 1990/91.
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signed with their old team and a few years later joined another team (or vice versa
first joined another team and then signed a second contract there) is sufficiently high
to rule out that the figures to be calculated suffer from a methodological bias.
Moreover, the greatest incentive to shirk exists in the period directly following the
signing of a new contract, which has the least bearing on future income. Conversely
the period in which the contract elapses provides the greatest incentive to put forth
effort, as it is the most important in the determination of prospective income. In other
words, a player who will become free-agent at the end of a season may play with
greater effort and intensity than they might otherwise in order to impress potential
employers. Therefore, the second step to be taken is the following: I will compare
annual changes in performance for players with short and long-term contracts as they
approach the period of renegotiation as well as players that have just signed con-
tracts of different length.
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Appendix
Table A1
The Performance of Stayers and Movers. Mean Comparison.
Performance Measure Stayer Mover Difference
Draft Number 26,4 37,7 ***
All Star Games 0,75 0,17 ***
Professional Years 6,4 5 ***
Years with Current Team 3,6 1,1 ***
Minutes per Game 25,3 17,4 ***
Scoring Performance 0,62 0,54 ***
Non-Scoring Performance 175,7 92,1 ***
Contract Duration in Years 4,5 2,7 ***
Salary in US$ 2.883.100 1.143.000 ***
*** p < .01
18
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